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Following the annexation of Crimea earlier this year, the EU has implemented escalating sanctions against
Russia. Borja Guijarro-Usobiaga writes on the impact the sanctions are having on both Russia
and Europe. He argues that with neither Russia nor the West willing to make unilateral concessions
to solve the crisis, the most likely result is a lasting political deadlock until the costs experienced by
both sides provide incentives to normalise relations.
On 29 July the European Union (EU) imposed so-called tier three sanctions against Russia. The
real effect of these measures is only starting to be felt now, yet the implications are far deeper than
many had imagined. At stake is not only Europe’s geopolitical and regional stability; businesses and
individuals on both sides of the table are starting to feel the impact of sanctions as well.
The new round of sanctions imposed on Russia is in many respects unprecedented. The EU has restricted Russian
banks’ access to long-term loans, it has imposed an embargo on the export of dual-use equipment for military use,
and it has banned the export of a wide range of items and technology related to the oil industry. The gas sector,
however, has been left untouched so far. These measures go far beyond the visa-bans and asset freezes that were
already in place against certain individuals involved in the destabilisation of Ukraine.
But sanctions are also unprecedented for another reason: the EU had never before imposed economic sanctions
against a country with which it shares so many commercial, energetic, and security ties. While the EU has had some
experience – and some would even argue success – in the use of economic sanctions against Iran, this time it has
entered into uncharted waters. And few seem to have thoroughly thought through the consequences of these
measures.
Far from forcing Putin to back down and put a brake on
his ambitions in Eastern Ukraine, sanctions have
contributed to a hardening of his position. Moreover, and
even though unintended, they have sparked nationalistic
sentiments in Russia, with polls registering a spike in
Putin’s popularity. Yet while Putin rallies support at
home, the EU and the US are unwilling to go back to
business as usual with him after the traumatic redrawing
of Europe’s borders by an ever assertive Russia.
Escalation has thus led to a political deadlock where
neither Putin nor the West are willing to make unilateral
concessions to solve the crisis. And given the unlikely
prospect of a direct military confrontation between the
two parties, a war of economic attrition seems the only
scenario left. With a solution to the regional crisis
slipping away, the coercive effect of sanctions is starting
to be felt on bothsides.
The economic costs of sanctions
Although no one knows for sure what the real cost of sanctions is, one thing is certain: they are imposing a huge
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economic burden on Russia. The flow of international investment into Russia has stalled, and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development has frozen all new projects in the country. Moreover, Russian banks have seen
their access to Western capital cut. This has increased the refinancing costs of banks, making it increasingly difficult
for Russia to pay its debt and limiting the Kremlin’s capacity to invest and modernise infrastructure, especially in the
extraction sector.
Furthermore, the rouble has continued to fall against the dollar, increasing the cost of imports. These difficulties add
to the shortages of products in supermarkets caused by Putin’s ban on imports of food and agricultural products
from the EU, which has backfired forcing businesses to struggle for substitutes in an underdeveloped domestic
market. To make things worse, inflation is expected to soar in the coming year.
Yet the most daunting task Putin has still to face is an uncertain future with increasingly low oil prices. With more
than half of Russia’s revenues originating in the export of oil and gas, financing the budget deficit is likely to become
challenging. Also, if prices remain low in the longer run, Russia is likely to have a bigger problem as its economy is
stagnating and its budgetary estimations are based on high oil and gas prices.
However, sanctions are taking their toll in Europe as well. Most importantly, sanctions have generated an immense
uncertainty among business circles. European firms are trying to make sense of the limitations and scope that
sanctions impose on their commercial activities, including trade, investment and insurance operations with third
parties operating in Ukraine and Russia. Due to the legal consequences that businesses could face if they violate
sanctions, concerns have arisen regarding the extent to which it is possible to carry on with their regular activities.
Unfortunately, complying with sanctions is not a straightforward task. Besides the difficulties in understanding what is
allowed and what is not due to a lack of clear regulatory provisions and national or European guidelines, other issues
such as linguistic differences between EU and US provisions (e.g. concepts like “derivatives” mean different things
in the US and the EU) pose further challenges for private companies. As a consequence, businesses are devoting
increasing economic and human resources to make sure they comply with current EU and US legislation.
However, the biggest concern for EU policy-makers is the fear of Russian retaliation. Putin’s ban on food and
agricultural imports from the EU has already had a very negative impact on Southern European farmers. And while
the European Commission has reacted swiftly by setting up a compensation fund to pay for export losses, new
retaliatory sanctions are looming on the horizon that might generate bigger disruptions for European economies.
The most obvious concern for some EU member states relates to a potential cut of Russian gas supplies during
winter. Putin has warned EU countries and Ukraine that they could see the flow of gas stopped if the latter does not
manage to pay its debts. Since the most important pipelines connecting Russia with EU countries cross Ukrainian
territory, anxiety among member states that are heavily dependent on EU gas have grown.
But the Kremlin has also threatened to impose other countermeasures. First, it has insinuated that it could close its
airspace to EU commercial flights. This would substantially increase the cost and duration of European flights to
Asia, as airlines would have to divert to longer routes, consequently requiring larger amounts of fuel. And second,
Putin has remained passive to legislative action in the Russian Duma that would allow for the nationalisation of
foreign assets to pay for the losses of Russian companies.
The geopolitical implications of sanctions
While the current deadlock between the West and Russia over Ukraine remains, other actors have taken advantage
of the situation. Latin American countries have been keen to replace the EU’s exports of food and agricultural
produce following Putin’s ban on EU imports and have ignored EU pledges not to do so. Most strikingly, and even
though the EU has managed to convince most of the countries on the path to EU membership to align themselves
with its sanctions regime, Serbia has refused to do so, rolling out the red carpet for Putin’s visit to Belgrade in
October instead.
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The EU’s incapacity to convince its allies to support its sanctions regime has also been evident in Asia, where Japan
has only imposed mild sanctions on Russia and where South Korea has refrained from imposing any measure
whatsoever. Yet the indisputable beneficiary of Western sanctions has been China. Since the beginning of the crisis,
China has played an ever more important role, with Russia moving closer to its eastern neighbour. The relations
between both countries have improved substantially in the last months, leading to a historic agreement on the
construction of gas pipelines from Russia to China.
Regional tensions are also mounting in other parts of Europe, as the Swedish government has been involved in the
chase of an (allegedly) Russian submarine in its territorial waters and as Russian spy planes have repeatedly
violated Estonia’s and Sweden’s airspace.
A way out?
The mutual trust that has been built between the West and Russia since the end of the Cold War has vanished.
Undoubtedly, sanctions stand in the way of improving the relationship with the Kremlin, yet the EU is not willing to lift
them without changes in Russia’s behaviour. Sanctions are thus likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future,
with all the uncertainty that this implies.
However, the political deadlock should not be read as a new version of the Cold War. Russia is now much more
integrated into the world economy, it has become a member of the World Trade Organization and it largely depends
on its exports of oil and gas to keep its economy afloat. Moreover, it is questionable whether Russia’s new economic
and political opening to Asia, and especially to China, constitutes a feasible long term alternative, as it will lead to an
uncomfortable asymmetric relationship for the Kremlin. Whether this shift actually takes place remains to be seen,
but it is more likely that Russia veers again toward Europe in the next few years.
The current uncertainty makes it hard to predict what will happen next or how long the conflict is likely to persist. The
only thing that seems clear is that Crimea’s annexation by Russia is now an irreversible process. Russia will struggle
to find international recognition for its action, and the West is likely to keep sanctions against the peninsula in place
until a solution is eventually found in the future. But for the time being, this is likely to become yet another frozen
conflict in the heart of Europe.
While many questions remain unanswered, western analysts are starting to accept that the standoff is going to last
longer than initially expected. A solution to the crisis is however not impossible, but it will require huge doses of
imagination, patience and, above all, time. As time passes and sanctions impose higher costs on both sides,
incentives should emerge to normalise relations. The signing of a gas deal between Russia, Ukraine and the EU is a
step in the right direction, yet it needs to be backed by a strong legal and political commitment by all parts. This
could then lead to more compromises regarding the situation in Eastern Ukraine.
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